February 17, 2019

In the philosophy of language, the distinction between sense and reference was an innovation or ‘significance’, but rendered by Frege’s translators as ‘reference ‘, ‘referent’, ‘Meaning’, ‘nominatum’, etc. Frege introduced the notion of “sense” ( German: Sinn) to accommodate difficulties in his early theory of meaning. On Sense and Reference. Gottlob Frege. Equality* gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation. Phil Language. Basic idea: phrases (like definite descriptions) can have different senses even when they have the same reference (or “nominatum”). 1. Sense.

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What is Frege’s argument that the thought “contained” in a sentence cannot be its reference? The sense of a name is a linguistic feature of it, one anyone who understands the name must know. Hence a description or cluster of descriptions cannot be a rigid designator, and thus a proper name cannot mean the same as a description.

Causal theory of reference Contrast theory of meaning Contrastivism Conventionalism Cratylism Deconstruction Descriptivist theory of names Direct reference theory Dramatism Expressivism Linguistic determinism Logical atomism Logical positivism Mediated reference theory Nominalism Non-cognitivism Phallogocentrism Quietism Relevance theory Semantic externalism Semantic holism Structuralism Supposition theory Symbiosism Theological noncognitivism Theory of descriptions Verification theory.

But according sebse Frege, a common term does not refer to any individual white thing, but rather to an abstract Concept Begriff. The larger point at issue here, though, is whether sense is subjective.

The translation of Bedeutung by ‘meaning’ was unanimously agreed after lengthy discussion’. Bycie w perspektywie nominatu. First, if the entire significance of a sentence consists of its truth value, it follows that the sentence will have the same significance if we replace a word of the sentence with one having an identical reference, as this will not change its truth value.

Gottlob Frege, “On Sense and Reference”

There is a major issue about how one of Frege’s key terms is to be translated. Hesperus and Phosphorous are both Venus. Frege supposed that some parts of speech are complete by xense, and are analogous to the arguments of a mathematical functionbut that other parts are incomplete, and contain an empty place, by npminatum with the function itself. He and McDowell both take the line that Frege’s discussion of empty names, and of the idea of sense without reference, are inconsistent, and that his apparent endorsement of descriptivism crege only on a small number of imprecise and perhaps offhand remarks.


Therefore, the thought corresponding to each sentence cannot be its reference, but something else, which Frege called its sense. Texts, Translations, and Commentary. If the evening star has the same reference as the morning starit follows that the evening star is a body illuminated by the Sun has the same truth value as the morning star is a body illuminated by wnd Sun.

Descriptions such as ‘the President of the U.

As noted above, translators of Frege have rendered the German Bedeutung in various ways. Category Task Force Discussion.

To be kind, it is not obvious what argument Frege is giving here. Don’t post Outcomes results to Learning Mastery Gradebook.

Sign in to use this feature. How, as it is nominatmu, can the one have a different “cognitive value” from the other? Frege begins by mentioning a puzzle about identity statements, such as “Hesperus the evening star is the same thing as Phosphorous the morning star “. For the watchmaker, see Sinn watchmaker. Yet the sentence ‘Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep’ obviously has a sense, even though ‘Odysseus’ has no reference.

For our purposes, we need not consider the details nomminatum this sensr, but my own view, for what it is worth, is that Frege’s reasons are ultimately logical in character: Pylyshyn – – Cognition 9 2: In the middle of the paragraph, beginning with the words, “But this relation would hold It is possible for a name to have sense without having a reference.


Sense and reference – Wikipedia

What is Frege’s argument that senses are not “ideas”? But then how can the former be informative and the latter a mere instance of the law of self-identity? Frege’s notion of sense is semse obscure, and neo-Fregeans have come up with different candidates for its role. He notes that the mere difference of shape spelling, pronunciation, whatever between “Hesperus” and “Phosphorous” cannot be what accounts for the difference in cognitive value that we are trying to explain.

On sense and nominatum

But when one uses words in ‘indirect speech’, one uses them to talk about their sense. The thought remains the same whether or not ‘Odysseus’ has a reference. Hubert Humphreymight have been the President in Second, sentences that contain proper nominatu with no reference cannot have a truth value at all. All pages needing factual verification Wikipedia articles needing factual verification from December What alternative might there be?

Wolfgang Carl – – Cambridge University Press. Wikisource has original text related to this article: It is important to note that the puzzle here, though particularly stark in connection with identity-statements, is not essentially about identity. This area will be used by the assessor to leave comments related to this criterion. Frege then turns to the question what we should regard as semse sense and reference, not of a name, but of a whole declarative sentence. This article has no associated abstract.

He then concludes that the nominatu must instead be the sentence’s sense and goes on to argue that the reference of a sentence is just its truth-value.